

## MILITARY PROBLEMS OF COUNTER INSURGENCY

### INTRODUCTION

Talking about the military problems of dealing with Insurgency would be a much easier subject if it were synonymous with what school histories described as Rebellions. A straight forward contest between Authority and a section of the Community that couldn't stand authority any more.

### ALLIES DIVIDED

Our experience is unfortunately that it is not so at all in practice and this especially seems to be the case when having been asked by an Allied government to help them suppress a Rebellion we find this government divided amongst itself to the extent of being at war with itself, so that cross currents get so mixed that when it comes down to the soldier in the field the first question he has to ask himself after some awful explosion, is whether this is the Enemy or our own side having a sort out.

Unfortunately in Arabia this sort of Tribal feud is endemic. Last week one Arab was found shot in Aden and although he could have been shot by the Egyptian Intelligence Service there were also four other reasons why he might have been demolished.

### REBELLIONS A SICKNESS

But we come down to this that Rebellions, by definition, are essentially the expression of a sickness in Government. Government may have become inadequate either through its own ineptitude or because changing circumstances too often engineered it from outside, have put a strain on it which it was never constituted to withstand. Rebellions therefore, stem from an inadequacy for one reason or another of Government. And the aim of any military operation must be the re-establishment of Good Government and definition of its responsibilities is not appropriate.

### AIM

### MILITARY A PART OF WHOLE

Military operations can only contribute when they are a part of the broad plan for the re-establishment of Good Government right across the field of administration. And because the services are as a rule only brought in as a last resort and late, they are so often the only framework on which to re-establish Good Government.

### COMMANDERS NEED TO UNDERSTAND CIVIL SIDE

This therefore makes it mandatory that Commanders should have a real understanding of the problems of Government and of Civil Administration. Aden is a small compact place. Everyone knows everyone else's problems and more often than not see each other daily.

### UNHAPPY FAMILIES

The opening sentence of the novel "ANNA KARENINA" reads "All happy families are more or less like one another, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own particular way."

I do not therefore propose to attempt to cover all today's unhappy families but it occurs to me that it would be most useful if I inclined very much towards my present difficulties in ARABIA. There, Insurgency is in a much earlier stage of development than of course VIETNAM and far smaller forces are involved. Nonetheless it has great possibilities and more or less everything is present in miniature.

NASSER V FAISAL

As you well know the broad issue, as our influence in ARABIA contracts, is the conflict between Gamel NASSER and King FAISAL of SAUDI ARABIA. MASSER a revolutionary have not.

NASSER A HAVE NOT  
A REVOLT

King FAISAL has embarked on a policy of Moslem solidarity in the Middle East and with his immense wealth and largely with United States aid, a programme of internal development and progress. The problems are immense and by our standards FAISAL's sense of time and urgency seems scarcely developed but he may be right.

NASSERS AIM TO  
PREVENT SURVIVAL  
OF FEDERATION

NASSER's intentions are quite clear. They are to isolate SAUDI ARABIA by subversion and in the immediate future to prevent the emergence of a stable Federation of SOUTH ARABIA, by the time we leave in 1968. He is preparing subversion, insurgency in the Gulf States; his agencies are already in MUSCAT and EAP. He is preparing to increase rebellious activities in the Federation of SOUTHERN ARABIA; and his aim is to prevent good government. Weapon IS + Propaganda. Fortunately by using, as he has had to, a base in a foreign country, YEMEN, he has induced an insurgency problem of his own with remarkable complexity and intractability and with luck one that will achieve signal dimensions.

NASSER AGAINST  
GOOD GOVT USING  
E/S. PROPAGANDA  
BOTH v.g.

GOVE OF S. ARABIA  
BRITISH PRODUCT

I said his aim is to prevent good government. Of what does government in SOUTHERN ARABIA consist? In the first place the Federation is a recent product of British advice. This area with the exception of ADEN itself consists of a number of highly individualistic states in feuds with one another, geographically isolated. They are by no means all convinced that without Federation they cannot survive alone. Their individual rule is autocratic and the target of propaganda. They are the only authority.

RULERS ONLY  
AUTHORITY

FEDERATION WEAK  
DEDICATED BR

The Federation is therefore weak and its of authority is still dependent on a British Civil Service, and British Communication It is our idea. ADEN is a colony which has joined the Federation. It is a wealthy port and its wealth essential to progress in the rest of the Federation.

WEDGE HILLS  
PLAINS

Its representatives in the Federal Council is proportional to its importance. Government was good and becoming progressively Arabised. Unfortunately the Tribal Territories are utterly contemptuous of the materialistic Adenis who in turn are afraid of them. Hillman & plains.

ADEN GOVT SACKED

Egyptians contrived to implicated ADEN Government in a policy of active terrorism and achieved their first aim of compelling the High Commissioner to suspend the constitution and revert to direct rule.

BETHAN  
THE PEOPLE

So much for the moment of Government, what about the people?

FOREIGN COUNTRY

We are of course in a foreign country amongst a people whose language we cannot interpret and the power of whose religion we don't understand we have said we are going in 1968. And we never seem able to learn the language of the inhabitants and communicate with them by the infuriating artifice of raising our voices.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE

ARAB FELLOWSHIP

And there is of course a natural fellowship among Arabs which inevitably includes us out, but strange to say frustrated Nationalism in ARABIA is not the issue that it has been elsewhere in providing the fertile ground for rebellion. Of the 100 or so detained in ADEN all are inside for terrorist activities and very few have joined the organisation out of motives of true nationalism. The majority are either mercenary criminals or opportunists. No one has been detained for political views unless you argue that murder is a political action, and this is being arranged.

XENOPHOBIA  
NOT NATIONALISM

ADEN DETS

RENT A THUG

RED BADS

Up country in the tribal areas, rebel recruitment is not difficult but again is not for Nationalistic reasons. There is always a faction that has fallen out with its own tribe or with their rule for a thousand different reasons quite unrelated to Nationalism; and it is these that the Egyptians recruit and train as mercenaries with a personal grudge to work off or just for the money.

XENOS AGAIN

AIM TO STOP GOVT

The purpose for which they are used is the same as terrorism in the streets. It is to prevent good government by attacking us who are providing security, by destroying new wells and agricultural development and by cutting communications by ambush or by mines. And you will find those whose living is in camel transport across the hills gladly contribute to minelaying as the only way to check the advance of the lorry trade up the new valley roads.

We have therefore in S.ARABIA, Government against many natural difficulties including a long frontier and we have EGYPT exploiting these natural difficulties and the inborn animosities to make good government very difficult indeed. In the Eastern Protectorate the State of MAHRA rejected any suggestion of Independence on the grounds that she had never been dependant. She was therefore entitled for a period of dependance to get roads and schools for nothing.

MAHRA

CYPRUS NATIONAL

But of course in CYPRUS the essence of EOKA was Nationalism in its most emotional and most unthinking.

CYPRUS had never been Greek, its population were mixed, but in classical times there had been Cretan, Mycenaean, and Greek settlements and the language and the greatest of all legends and traditions of the Western world had come down to them.

In 1955 CYRRUS with an alien government, with a restless youth, with such names as ACHILLES, AJAX, THEOCRATES, ULYSSES and as a part of British Policy educated at schools at which not only were all the text books, including history, provided from GREECE, but Masters too were from GREECE.

When trouble began, and GRIEVAS, supported by GREECE appealed to all the latent emotion of ATHENS and ITHACA and the Argonauts; the appeal to youth was of course immediate and there was a rush to the school laboratories.

I said this was unthinking because the struggle was supposed to be for ENOSIS, union with GREECE.

GREECE was an intensely poor country made even poorer by the war and could offer CYPRUS nothing but taxations. In 1955 the first year of the insurrection over 3,000 Cypriots migrated to Britain and 4 to GREECE. But we must remember in war that emotion is the enemy of reason.

FIRST PRINCIPLE  
INTELLIGENCE

SPECIAL BRANCH  
KENYA, CYPRUS, ADEN

As a Soldier always the first priority is Intelligence - adequate knowledge of what is happening, a forecast based on something better than guess work, of what is likely to happen. In British Territories this has meant an efficient Police Special Branch. In KENYA special Branch information gave us all the warnings but they never got anywhere. In CYPRUS Special Branch at first scarcely existed and in ADEN it was the same. Of course everyone agrees that the importance of intelligence is obvious. But in practice this is a long way from putting this in front and keeping it there, and making subordinate commanders do the same week after week.

SECOND CENTRAL INT

And the second priority without which an Intelligence Plan cannot succeed is that it must be centrally directed. And we hardly ever succeed in this. One man must be allowed to impose his direction on every aspect down to the lowest echelons. The selling of information in ARABIA is a recognised trade and in ADEN on more than one occasion we have found an informant selling the same story to four agencies with the obvious danger that this particular information wears the appearance of having triple confirmation.

INFO A TRADE

ENEMY ATTACK ON  
INT

To an insurgent force success will depend absolutely not only on accurate intelligence but on denying it to you.

You must always expect a deliberate and sustained attack on your sys which usually develops in four phases.

FIRST INFILTRATION

The first is infiltration into Government and Police as a part of the process of penetration of all Government departments but with the special purpose of identifying your intelligence system.

SECOND TERROR

The second is the terrorising of the local population into silence. In ADEN no local national has yet come forward in court as a witness to murder for he knows he will have less than a week to live. The silence of the public in NICOSIA and in LARNACA could not be broken.

THIRD MURDER OF  
INT

The third phase is the murder of members of our organisation. We frustrated a deliberate attempt in ADEN a year ago.

ATTACK DEVIOUSLY

Now under these conditions with access to all normal channels of information closed you come to depend almost wholly on interrogation. And the fourth phase of attack is subtle and devious and is an attack on your interrogation system by denouncing them publically to the United Nations, the International Red Cross and to such organisations as Amnesty International as torturers. More topical than I had planned.

MORE TOPICAL

INNOCENCE NOT  
ENOUGH

And it is not by any means sufficient to have a clear record in these matters to ensure that your only machinery for obtaining intelligence is not brought to a halt.

NOT AFFECT IRON  
CURTAIN

This sort of attack does not I suppose affect Iron Curtain Countries but it does affect us very much indeed. Interrogation is not a pleasant job and we depend on volunteers who have been under such constant pressure of accusation, that they have once resigned to a man. We have the most thorough system of medical inspection on arrest, medical inspection before and after interrogation, medical records, but none of this does anything to stop accusation, and to stop visitation.

FOOL PROOF SYSTEM

The use of cigarette ends for counter irritant is not easy to explain.

This progaganda is beamed to destroy the Intelligence system and is I am sure in full use inVIETNAM as indeed it is in ADEN but my impression that in the past is was fairly hit and miss has now become a deft weapon. VIETNAM have I believe 500,000 in detention

NO LONGER ANY  
SANCTION

Hitherto our only sanction that we have had over the prisoner has been fear induced by what the UAR Radio in TAIZ has led him to believe of us. That has now gone? Examples of fainting.

BE POLITICAL FOR  
UN

Earlier I said that we had no political detainees only terrorists. Anyone who may be thinking of going into the insurgency business is well advised to get the United Nations to recognise all arrested murderers as political detainees because this will get them first in the queue to be let out when UN takes over. And if you plan to take over a country after independence you want your gun men early. Time is short and this of course is why that well known Scandinavian, Mr. Rudegeld of Amnesty Int is concerned with Political prisoners. We have been very careful to avoid Political Prisoners. To have accepted him would have admitted CAIRO VISIT

The effect of course on the Government Machine of losing this battle and allowing the enemy such freedom of action is of course not only a military one; but it rapid brings the Civil Administration to a halt. One of the effects of a steady erosion of the Administrative machine is the lowering of morale of the expatriate who in due course goes.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

I want now to say a few words about military operations and I propose first to deal with the problem in towns. I am dealing with towns because in many ways the difficulties are more serious and the consequences of failure more direct.

OPPRESSION

If an insurgency is properly directed the rebels' main aim in towns will be by acts of terrorism to force authority to multiply security measures whose widening impact will progressively alienate sympathy and encourage the moderates to join the extremists in a solid front against the Security Forces.

MODERATES TO  
EXTREMISTS

If in this way they can get authority to play into their hands and to get the moderates to join the extremists then the silencing of witnesses becomes acceptable and it is this silence that makes the issue of Intelligence so difficult and so absolutely vital.

AVOID EXCESS GOADING

Every counter action therefore that one is tempted to take such as the imposition of curfews, road checks, must be set against this enemy of aim and this especially applies to sustained curfews which are too often imposed by the pressing need to do something.

UNFIT TO GOVERN

CONTROL BY POLICE

In normal times control is exercised by the Civil Police whose authority is recognised and accepted and we first get into difficulties when our support becomes oppressive and obvious and this is a vicious circle because this only happens when the Police become ineffective.

CYPRUS POLICE

Now in CYPRUS the Civil Police were ineffective for several obvious reasons.

They were not geared to any emergency.

They were divided between GREEK and TURKISH speaking.

They were penetrated.

There were no police barracks or quarters and were under pressure in their homes from anyone who cared to call. In schoolboy riots their children were in the forefront, in due course they were terrified into defection. At one time I had to mount an operation to get them on the beat.

ADEN POLICE N.B.G.

NOT TO BLAME  
COCKTAIL PARTY  
OUT 68

MUST KEEP

In ADEN they are not effective against terrorism and they are penetrated. But as yet the Egyptians have not mounted a major effort against them to achieve mass defection and attacks have only been against those who have helped us. The neutral keep out of the light; good boys are at present safe. Yet it is absolutely vital that however ineffective the Civil Police may become they must be kept in being for in the end it is on them that good government must depend and not on the Army.

EFFECT OF ARMY OPS  
WITHOUT POLICE

However reluctant the Police may be to co-operate they must be persuaded to seem to do so. They cannot be allowed to drop out altogether and their presence with the Military is an essential insurance against the fabrication of charges of rapacious behaviour. The Egyptians have exploited this difficulty so effectively in ADEN that if a search is carried out amongst private property without the presence of Civil Police, we are automatically accused of every crime with all the force of their propaganda machines that they can muster.

In ADEN therefore I am determined to keep the Police Force in being. Any evidence of Police complicity, of harbouring, even of storage of arms and explosives, I have got to balance this danger against the consequences of a disintegration of the Force that would probably follow a massive search of their barracks.

This is not made easier by the knowledge that any policeman who becomes associated with us will be answerable when we leave in 1968, if not before.

I am directly responsible to the High Commissioner in ADEN for Internal Security and as the Security Commander the Police are under my command. Essential.

Notwithstanding that, I have said that the Police are not really effective against terrorism. This is a great help but my authority needs to be used with great restraint or I will get into difficulties.

MIL NETWORK

How do we get prisoners for Int.

MAIN ISSUES IN TOWNS

These therefore are the main issues in urban or town areas:

- a. The avoidance of playing into the enemy's hands by being forced into oppressive measures.
- b. Keeping the Police in being.
- c. Above all, Intelligence.

One final word of warning in towns. Apart from the Law, and ethics, be awfully careful of private "rubbers out". It has often in ADEN been tempting to raise a small mercenary force of Tribesmen who would be paid an adequate sum for each terrorist head produced in the morning. Sooner or later they always find it pays better to rob tye banks, you can get them out and then the enemy raises the pay and they work for both.

UP COUNTRY

AIM TO CONTROL AREAS

YEMEN BASES

ARAB WON'T TELL ON  
ARAB

DISSIDENTS RECRUITED  
FROM FEUDS

TARGETS ARMY  
SECURITY AND WELLS

INF LACK OF SKILL

Similar problems of course exist up country where the enemy's aim will be gradually to control areas, the operation beginning with sabotage, ambush and terrorism of villages and communities into active aid or at least silence and gradually reaching the state that we now have in VIETNAM which has very large areas under dissident control and for all practical purposes a state of war exists with the additional difficulty of there being no real front and no security behind the line. The enemy has vital need of secure bases and of intelligence and communication. In SOUTHERN ARABIA, the majority of insurgent activity is mounted from across the border in YEMEN where the Egyptians have established training centres near the main routes. From there armed bands of about 40 - 50 strong and well trained carrying out operations either sufficiently close to the Frontier to enable them to get back before it's light or staying for a few days in order to reach out further. Here we are up against the difficulty of information, Arabs generally being reluctant to inform on a fellow Arab to a European; - GEOGRAPHY - and in any case the very slowness of communications in difficult country so that a report of the presence of a gang may be several days late. Inaccessible. Have already said.

These dissidents recruited so often from tribesmen who have fallen out with someone are operating in familiar territory and are extremely difficult to pick up before they carry out an attack. These are usually against British Army Camps, since our main contribution to good government in the hills is to provide security, or against such targets as new irrigation schemes, wells and roads.

Although these attacks against our camps are regularly seen off we still lack the skill to round up these parties either before or after they have come across and we seldom effect greater casualties than one would expect at night with two sides firing at one another from behind cover at 200 - 300 yards.

We have developed a surveillance procedure that depends on greater skill than is found in the average unit and it is this:

Observation parties set off on foot and in darkness for a suspected area. They must travel silently, they must keep off tracks and they must avoid using wells, for footprints will be picked up by villagers in the morning and once this operation is blown, it might as well be called off.

To resupply by air would of course give them away. Therefore to give them a range of 4 days the soldier will, in addition to his weapon, ammunition and food, have to carry 40 lbs of water per head. He may have to lie up motionless in the sun for 11 or 12 hours. This approach march is an extremely severe test when the country is segmented with precipices and there is no water or cover.

On reaching the area it is kept in observation for as long as water will last. 3 - 4 galls per man.

As soon as a dissident band is located either resting in a village or on the march an extensive rehearsed operation is put into effect which will include the flying in by Wessex of cordon parties and the reinforcement and repositioning of special forces for the kill which will include artillery and ground attack.

UNFORGIVING CTY  
CIRCUS NOT AN  
ANSWER

These operations are of course by VIETNAM standards on a very small scale. But they need great skill and much practice in the way to locate a band and to sew them up without a mess-up. Unforgiving Country.

(I have said) By USA standards my chopper lift scarcely exists. But it is not unusual for up and coming senior army officers to refuse to understand why I have bases up country and why I do not fly my army about with such airlifts as I have piuncing and snooping endlessly. My answer is that whether or not I had lift enough for this; success can only come from information and from surprise. Even with information the noise of a chopper gives time for the enemy to hide.

HEARTS AND MINDS

I have not the time to cover Hearts and Minds which is an aspect of good government.

PROPAGANDA

Nor of Propaganda which is the art of persuading everyone that it is.

To finish I propose telling you the difficulties that I foresee arising in ARABIA in the future.

We have said we are leaving ADEN in 1968.

EGYPT WINS

I foresee EGYPT doing all she can to convince the world we are being driven out of ADEN by a rebellion. Life is going to become increasingly noisy in ADEN and there will be mounting pressure from the Federation to take over responsibility for Internal Security from Britain early. UN?

FEDS TAKE OVER

UP COUNTRY

Up country a dramatic increase in Insurgence, I would have thought less easy though the Egyptians are now training a Liberation Army for this purpose. Keep the pressure up by all means but not so much as to unite tribal forces against them. See anyone except air power.

EAP TO AID REBELS  
MUSCAT

In the Eastern Protectorate continuous efforts at Political penetration and the introduction of Egyptian influence through school masters and bribery. I see the increased use of the Eastern Protectorate to aid rebellion in the SULTANATE of MUSCAT and OMAN where there is already dissidence in the SOUTHERN DHOFAR Province and there is what might be called a rebellion which is on retired pay in the NORTH in OMAN.

BAHREIN, SHARJAH

There is no reason why this situation should not be held. But we must remember that when we leave ADEN efforts that are at present absorbed against us there, if they are not used to destroy the Federation, by an allout effort including possibly a coup, that is followed by a request for UAR aid, are available not only MUSCAT but our position in BAHREIN and SHARJAH and those States which we are at present developing to look after themselves. We shall only be in trouble in the Persian Gulf if we ignore the insurgent threat which at present is small but undoubtedly is there.

I have in this talk taken you round the Southern half of ARABIA in illustrating some of the Military Problems of dealing with Insurgency.

In this case it has been Egypt versus ourselves and versus SAUDI ARABIA and the two issues on which I would like to close are these.

MILITARY PROBLEM  
A PART OF WHOLE

The military problem is wholly involved in the Political problem as one of the instruments of Policy and never be disentangled. Do not underestimate the problem of learning enough about everyone elses difficulties, always to be tolerant of one another and their mistakes.

When things go a bit wrong this essential jointery is the first vital aspect to be caught in the cross fire of International Politics.

INTELLIGENCE

The second issue is that though Intelligence is first priority do not underestimate the difficulties of keeping it there, of getting everyone to agree that it must be kept there and perhaps most difficult to accept that there is one Director of Intelligence. I am thankful to say that the Joint relationships, Civil and Military in ADEN have already been caught up in this cross-fire of International Politics not to be in the least worried about the outcome.

EIS type is cheap.